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If physicalism is true, everything is physical. In other words, everything su-
pervenes on, or is necessitated by, the physical. Accordingly, if there are logi-
cal/mathematical facts, they must be necessitated by the physical facts of the
world. Below I will sketch the first steps of a physicalist philosophy of math-
ematics;1 that is, how physicalism can account for logical and mathematical
facts.
We will proceed as follows. First we will clarify what logical/mathematical
facts actually are. Then, we will discuss how these facts can be accommodated
in the physicalist ontology.
This might sound like immanent realism (as in Mill, Armstrong, Kitcher,
or Maddy), according to which the mathematical concepts and propositions re-
flect some fundamental features of the physical world. Although, in my final
conclusion I will claim that mathematical and logical truths do have contingent
content in a sophisticated sense, and they are about some peculiar part of the
physical world, I reject the idea, as this thesis is usually understood, that math-
ematics is about the physical world in general. In fact, I reject the idea that
mathematics is about anything. In contrast, the view I am proposing here will
be based on the strongest formalist approach to mathematics.
According to formalism, mathematical objects carry no meanings. “The for-
mulas are not about anything; they are just strings of symbols”.2 Hilbert char-
acterized mathematics as a game played according to certain simple rules with
meaningless marks on paper.3 That’s all. Mathematics has nothing to do with
the metaphysical concept of infinity. Mathematics does not produce and does
not solve Zeno paradoxes. Mathematical structures are totally indifferent to our
intuition about space, time, probability or continuity. The words in a formal
system have no meaning other than that which may be given to them by the
axioms. As Hilbert—allegedly—expressed this idea in a famous aphorism about
Euclidean geometry: “One must be able to say at all times—instead of points,
straight lines, and planes—tables, chairs, and beer mugs.”4
According to the formalist standards, no step of reasoning can be taken
without a reference to an exactly formulated list of axioms and rules of inference.
Even the most “self-evident” logical principles must be explicitly formulated
in the list of axioms and rules. Thus, a precisely formalized mathematical
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derivation is like a “machinery of cogwheels”, rather than the discovery of the
“rational order in the world” by an “uncomputable consciousness” in its “clear
and distinct intuitions”.
Two different kinds of truth in a physical theory
Let us first clarify the essential difference between mathematical truth and a
semantical truth in a scientific theory describing something in the world. A
physical theory (L, S) is a formal system L with a partial semantics S, where S
is pointing to the empirical world.5 In general, L is a (first-order) formal lan-
guage with some logical axioms and the derivation rules (usually the first-order
predicate calculus with identity), the axioms of certain mathematical theories,
and, of course, some physical axioms.
Now, a sentence A in physical theory (L, S) can be true in two different
senses:
Truth1: A is a theorem of L, that is, L ` A (which is a mathematical truth
within the formal system L, a fact of the formal system L).
Truth2: According to the semantics S, A refers to an empirical fact (about
the physical system described by the theory).
For example, ‘The electric field strength of a point charge is kQr2 ’ is a theorem of
Maxwell’s electrodynamics—one can derive the corresponding formal expression
from the Maxwell equations. (This is a fact of the formal system L.) On the
other hand, according to the semantics relating the symbols of the Maxwell
theory to the empirical terms, this sentence corresponds to an empirical fact
(about the point charges).
In a physical theory, Truth1 and Truth2 are independent concepts, in the
sense that one does not automatically imply the other. Of course, one of the
aims of a physical theory is to keep Truth1 and Truth2 in synchrony throughout
the region of validity of the theory in question. However, assume that Γ is a
set of true2 sentences in L, i.e., each sentence in Γ refers to an empirical fact,
and also assume that Γ ` A in L. It does not automatically follow that A is
true2. Whether A is true2 is again an empirical question. If so, then it is a new
empirically obtained information about the world, confirming the validity of the
whole physical theory (L, S).
But if it turns out that A is not true2, then this information disconfirms
the physical theory, as a whole. That is to say, one has to think about revising
one of the constituents of (L, S), the physical axioms, the semantics S, the
mathematical axioms, or the axioms of logic or the derivation rules we applied
in the derivation of A—probably in this order.
Mathematical propositions have no meanings
Having clarified these two kinds of “truth”, it is worthwhile briefly reviewing
the main argument for the formalist thesis that mathematical propositions have
no meanings—even if, as platonists and intuitionists assume, these meanings
would refer not to the physical but to the platonic or to the mental realms.
The argument is, in some weak sense, based on the truth-condition theory of
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Alphabet
variables x, y, z, . . .
individual constants e (identity)
function symbols i, p (inverse, product)
predicate symbol =
others (, ), ,
logical symbols ∀,¬ →
Derivation rules
(MP) φ, (φ→ ψ) ⇒ ψ (modus ponens)
(G) φ ⇒ ∀xφ (generalization)
Axioms I. (logical)
(PC1) (φ→ (ψ → φ))
(PC2) ((φ→ (ψ → χ))→ (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ χ))
(PC3) ((¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → φ))
(PC4) (∀x (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ∀xψ)) (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC5) (∀xφ→ φ) (given that x is not free in φ)
(PC6) (∀xφ(x)→ φ(y)) (given that whenever a free occurrence of x
is replaced by y, y is free in φ(y))
(E1) x = x
(E2) t = s→ fn (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un) = fn (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un)
(E3) t = s→ (φ (u1, u2, . . . , t, . . . un)→ φ (u1, u2, . . . , s, . . . un))
Axioms II. (of group theory)
(G1) p(p(x, y), z) = p(x, p(y, z)) (associative law)
(G2) p(e, x) = x (left identity)
(G3) p(i(x), x) = e (left inverse)
Figure 1: Group theory
meaning. If we accept that “a meaning for a sentence is something that de-
termines the conditions under which the sentence is true or false”,6 and the
physical realist/platonist/intuitionist understanding of mathematics is correct,
then the truth-condition of a mathematical proposition must be found in the
physical/platonic/mental world. In that case, in the verification of a mathe-
matical statement, there must occur some reference both to the state of affairs
in the physical/platonic/mental world and to the means by which we have epis-
temic access to these worlds. But there is no trace of this in the practice of
mathematics.
For example, consider a very simple mathematical theory: the theory of
groups (Fig. 1). What will the mathematician answer to the following questions:
“Why is p(e, p(e, e)) = e true?”; “How do we know that p(e, p(e, e)) = e is
true?”; “How can we verify that p(e, p(e, e)) = e is true?”? In answering these
question, the mathematician never even mentions how the things are in the
physical/platonic/mental world and never even mentions the epistemic means
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(1) p(e, x) = x (G2)
(2) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x) (G)
(3) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x)→ p(e, e) = e (PC6)
(4) p(e, e) = e (2), (3), (MP)
(5) (∀x)(p(e, x) = x)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (PC6)
(6) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e) (2), (5), (MP)
(7) p(e, e) = e→ p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e (E3)
(8) p(e, p(e, e)) = p(e, e)→ p(e, p(e, e)) = e (4), (7), (MP)
(9) p(e, p(e, e)) = e (6), (8), (MP)
Figure 2: The proof of p(e, p(e, e)) = e
by which we have access to these realms. For the mathematician’s final argument
is that sentence p(e, p(e, e)) = e has a proof in group theory; and (s)he will show
us an evidence like in Fig. 2. In Dummett’s words:
Like the empiricist view, the platonist one fails to do justice to the
role of proof in mathematics. For, presumably, the supra-sensible
realm is as much God’s creature as is the sensible one; if so, condi-
tions in it must be as contingent as in the latter. [...] [W]e do not
seek, in order to refute or confirm a [mathematical] hypothesis, a
means of refining our intuitive faculties, as astronomers seek to im-
prove their instruments. Rather, if we suppose the hypothesis true,
we seek for a proof of it, and it remains a mere hypothesis, whose
assertion would therefore be unwarranted, until we find one.7
Therefore, a mathematical proposition (like “p(e, p(e, e)) = e”) does not have
meaning; it does not refer to anything and cannot be true or false in the ordinary
semantical sense (in the sense of Truth2). It is actually not a linguistic object,
it is just a “brick” in a formal system—consequently, it does not express a fact
whatsoever.
It is important to note that one must not confuse such a mathematical “brick”
with the meta-mathematical sentence stating the provability of this “brick”; for
example, “p(e, p(e, e)) = e” with “{Group} ` p(e, p(e, e)) = e”. The latter is
a meaningful meta-mathematical sentence, asserting a property of the formal
system called group theory, namely that there is a proof of p(e, p(e, e)) = e in the
system. The validity of this statement can be verified by the close observation
of Figure 2. This is what can be considered as a mathematical fact.
Ontology of formal systems
Now we arrive at the point where the physicalist interpretation of mathemat-
ics exceeds the standard formalist philosophy of mathematics. The question
we are asking now is: Where are the states of affairs located in the ontolog-
ical picture of the world that make the meta-mathematical propositions like
“{Group} ` p(e, p(e, e)) = e” true or false? The main thesis of the physical-
ist philosophy of mathematics is that a formal system must be regarded as a
physical system which consists of signs and derivational mechanisms embodied
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Notebook
Figure 3: A formal system represented in a notebook with a CD. The CD con-
tains a program making the computer to list the theorems of the formal system
in concrete physical objects and concrete physical processes. Therefore, a Σ ` φ-
type meta-mathematical proposition expresses an objective fact of the physical
world, namely, a fact of the formal system itself as a particular portion of the
physical world.
The argument will proceed in three stages; I shall show that
(I) A formal systems can be represented in a physical system.
(II) We have access to a formal systems only in some concrete physical
representation.
(III) Actually, there is nothing to be “represented”; there is nothing be-
yond the flesh and blood physical “representations”.
(I) Imagine a notebook with a CD containing the whole program completely
determining the notebook’s behavior (Fig. 3). On the basis of the program, the
computer lists, in some order, the theorems and the proofs of a formal system.
In this way, in the “computer + CD” system, we have a physical representation
of the formal system in question. In this representation, it is obviously true
that the fact of whether or not a given formula φ is a theorem, that is, whether
or not the computer will print out formula φ to the screen, is a fact of the
physical world; namely, it is entirely determined by the physical process going
on within the region symbolized by the dotted line; it is predetermined by the
physical laws and the initial state of the computer and the CD (note that a
“program” is nothing but a certain physical state of the surface of the CD).
Thus, in this physical representation, the statement that Σ ` φ is an ordinary
scientific statement:
(1) it expresses an objective fact of the physical world
(2) it can be true before anybody discovers it
(3) it is a posteriori, and accordingly, not necessary and not certain.
Points (1) and (2) are quite obvious; they are straightforward consequences of
the fact that Σ ` φ asserts the existence of a physical process inside of the dotted
line, irrespectively of whether anybody observes this process or not. Point (2)
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holds even in a stronger sense. Σ ` φ actually asserts the existence of a physical
process given certain initial conditions (notebook+CD) within the dotted line.
The laws of nature probably predetermine whether this process is possible or
not, even if nobody has initiated such a process yet. This simply refers to the
normal situation in sciences, that things may exist in the world that have not
been discovered yet. For example, it was true that the laws of physics admitted
a chemical process ending with a PVC (polyvinyl chloride) molecule, even before
the chemist Eugen Baumann discovered the existence of this process in 1872.
Point (3) sounds baffling, especially in the light of the age-long dispute be-
tween rationalism and empiricism. We will return to this issue in the last section.
At this stage, however, this is only about the physical representation of the for-
mal system; and Σ ` φ is no doubt a contingent fact of the physical world inside
of the dotted line; not necessary, not certain, not a priori. It can be known only
by a posteriori means, just like a chemical reaction.
(II) What causes us to believe that, although it cannot be known a priori
whether the computer will print out formula φ to the screen, still Σ ` φ in the
mathematical sense is a necessary/a priori knowable truth? This belief comes
from the following intuition: “The programmed computer is merely a physical
representation of an abstract mathematical formal system in which Σ ` φ is true.
If this physical representation is faithful then the computer necessarily prints
out formula φ to the screen. If the computer happens not to print out φ to the
screen, it only means that the physical representation is not faithful.” But how
can anybody know that Σ ` φ is true in the formal system “in the mathematical
sense”? The usual idea is that it can be known to anyone who executes the
formal derivation of φ from Σ in the head. So what we actually do is represent
the formal system in a brain and observe the behavior of the brain. Human
brain is however not entirely reliable, so we prefer to execute the derivation in
a brain+hand+pen+paper system. Anyway, from a physicalist point of view,
it does not matter whether the formal system in question is represented in a
human brain or a brain+hand+pen+paper system or any other physical system.
As a matter of fact, we can represent the formal system in the mathematical
sense in another computer; and if this second computer prints out φ, we say
that Σ ` φ is a priori true; and, accordingly, if the first computer also prints
out φ to the screen, we say that it works properly; and the representation of the
abstract/mathematical formal system in the first computer is faithful. But what
would be the reason to put the second computer in such a privileged position?
Upon what grounds can one physical representation be singled out as “the right
one”? It is nonsense.
We have to recognize that the only sources of our mathematical knowledge
are the formal systems embodied in concrete physical forms; and this knowledge
can be obtained only by a posteriori means. From this point of view we must
agree with the quantum computer theorists David Deutsch, Artur Ekert, and
Rossella Lupacchini:
Numbers, sets, groups and algebras have an autonomous reality quite
independent of what the laws of physics decree, and the properties
of these mathematical structures can be just as objective as Plato
believed they were (and as Roger Penrose now advocates). But
they are revealed to us only through the physical world. It is only
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physical objects, such as computers or human brains, that ever give
us glimpses of the abstract world of mathematics.
...
It seems that we have no choice but to recognize the dependence of
our mathematical knowledge (though not, we stress, of mathematical
truth itself) on physics, and that being so, it is time to abandon the
classical view of computation as a purely logical notion independent
of that of computation as a physical process.8
(III) In contrast to the first part of the above quoted passage, in my view,
the ontological outcome of these epistemological considerations is this: if there
are no knowable truths other than the ones knowable from the physical world,
there is no reason to be ontologically committed to the abstract/platonic things
that these other truths would be about. But before drawing such a conclusion,
let us consider a possible objection.
Many philosophers of mathematics, while admitting that a formal system
is always represented in physical form, still assume that there is an “abstract
structure” behind this physical representation, something that is represented.
Sometimes we find the same ambivalent views in the formalist school. Curry
writes:
[A]lthough a formal system may be represented in various ways, yet
the theorems derived according to the specifications of the primi-
tive frame remain true without regard to changes in representation.
There is, therefore, a sense in which the primitive frame defines a
formal system as a unique object of thought. This does not mean
that there is a hypostatized entity called a formal system which ex-
ists independently of any representation. On the contrary, in order
to think of a formal system at all we must think of it as represented
somehow. But when we think of it as formal system we abstract
from all properties peculiar to the representation.9
What does such an “abstraction” actually mean? What do we obtain if we
abstract from some unimportant, peculiar properties of a physical system? The
important fact is that the abstraction procedure itself is a formal procedure
going on in a formal system, namely, in a physical theory (L, S) describing the
physical system in question. In the theoretical description we can differentiate
the important and unimportant features of the object physical system, and
change from a more detailed representation of the system to a less detailed one.
And all this goes on in a formal system L which also is “represented somehow”,
in Curry’s terminology; that is, in a flesh and blood formal system.
Of course, the same holds if the object physical system itself is (“a physical
representation of”) a formal system. Instead of obtaining an “abstract formal
system” we are continuously in another flesh and blood formal system.
By the same token, one cannot obtain an “abstract formal system” as an
“equivalence class of isomorphic formal systems” or something like that, since
in order to think of such things as “isomorphism”, “equivalence”, “equivalence
class” at all we must think of them as living in a formal system—“represented
somehow”. For it is a categorical mistake to talk about “isomorphism” between
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Lphysical system
S
abstraction
Figure 4: The abstraction from some unimportant, peculiar properties of a phys-
ical system is going on in a flesh and blood formal system, namely, in a physical
theory (L, S) describing the physical system in question
physical objects. To compare physical systems, for example formal systems
L1, L2, . . . Ln, we have to use a theory which is capable of describing all of
L1, L2, . . . Ln. That is to say we have to have a physical theory (M,S), where
M is another formal system—also “represented somehow”—and the semantics
S points partly to L1, which is one part of the physical world, and partly to L2,
which is another part of the physical world, and so on (Fig. 5). Since “isomor-
phism”, “equivalence class”, etc. are set-theoretic concepts, M must be a formal
system containing set theory. Formal systems L1, L2, . . . Ln are simultaneously
represented in the physical theory (M,S). Only in M it is meaningful to say
that the theoretical models of L1, L2, . . . Ln are isomorphic and constitute an
equivalence class. Only in M we can define the prototype of these structures,
which can be regarded as an “abstract mathematical structure”. And, more im-
portantly, all these mathematical objects live in the formal systemM , in a flesh
and blood formal system existing in the physical world.
Thus, formal systems are always flesh and blood physical systems. These
concrete physical systems should not be regarded as physical “representations”
of some “abstract formal systems”. Abstraction does not produce such abstract
things over and above the physically existing formal systems—abstraction is a
move from the concrete to the concrete.
Note that this claim does not deny the ontological commitment to univer-
sals in the sense of scientific realism. When a satisfactorily confirmed physical
theory (L, S) claims that a physical object has a certain property adequately
represented by means of a formal system L, then this reflects an objective fea-
ture of physical reality. When many different physical objects display a similar
property that is describable by means of the same element of a formal system,
then we may generalize and claim that these physical objects all possess the
feature in question. This will be a true general feature of the group of objects
in question—described by means of the elements of a formal system as a real
physical system. This is also true for the description of some general features
of a group of formal systems. But, this realist commitment does not entitle us
to claim that “abstract structures” exist over and above the real formal systems
of physical existence. Again, the reason is that if we tried to consider such an
“abstract structure” as a feature of the formal system itself, or as a general fea-
ture of many similar formal systems, then we would only obtain some elements
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Figure 5: It is a categorical mistake to talk about “isomorphism” between phys-
ical systems. “Isomorphism” is a concept which is meaningful only in a formal
system containing set theory. In order to say that “physical representations of
formal systems” are “isomorphic” we need a physical theory (M,S) in which the
object systems are simultaneously represented
of another formal system of physical existence.
To sum up, a formal system is a part of the physical world; the marks of
the formal system are physical objects or physical phenomena related to the
system and the derivation rules are embodied in those regularities that govern
the system’s behavior. The existence of a mathematical derivation, making a
proposition of type Σ ` φ true, is a physical fact of the formal system as a
part of the physical world. To prove a theorem is nothing but to observe this
fact—for example, to observe a derivation process in a computer—that is, to
observe a physical fact about a physical system. That is all.
Thus, physicalism completes the formalist foundation of mathematics and
removes the last residues of platonism, mentalism and immanent realism.10
The physicalist ontology of mathematical truth makes it completely pointless in
mathematics to introduce a concept of truth different from that of being proved.
A mathematical proposition, a theorem, as a formula in a formal system, does
not carry meaning and semantic truth. At the same time, however, the fact that
it is a theorem is a physical fact—a fact of the flesh and blood formal system
itself. In this way, indeed, “mathematical truth is a part of objective reality”.
This is the way I propose to “naturalize mathematics”. In this way, math-
ematical knowledge is not conventional—there is nothing conventional in the
statement Σ ` X. It is not trivial—sometimes it is highly non-trivial whether
Σ ` X. It is not perfect, not a priori, and not certain. Just like non-
mathematical sciences, mathematics delivers to us knowledge of contingent facts
about a particular part of the physical world. Formal systems constitute this
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particular part of the physical world. This is what we can call “mathematical
reality”, and mathematicians rightly think themselves as scientists, exploring
the intricacies of mathematical reality.
Induction versus deduction
It is a long tradition in the history of philosophy that—in Leibniz’s words:
There are [...] two kinds of truths: those of reasoning and those
of fact. The truths of reasoning are necessary and their opposite is
impossible; the truths of fact are contingent and their opposites are
possible.11
And, as Ayer points out, the empiricist encounters the following difficulties:
Accordingly the empiricist must deal with the truths of logic and
mathematics in one of the following ways: he must say either that
they are not necessary truths, in which case he must account for the
universal conviction that they are; or he must say that they have no
factual content, and then he must explain how a proposition which
is empty of all factual content can be true and useful and surprising.
[...]
If neither of these courses proves satisfactory, we shall be obliged
to give way to rationalism. We shall be obliged to admit that there
are some truths about the world which we can know independently
of experience; [...]12
Logical empiricists did not reject the necessity and certainty of mathematical
and logical truths. According to their solution these truths have no factual
content. In contrast, we have arrived at the conclusion that mathematical and
logical truths are not necessary and not certain, but they do have factual con-
tent referring to the real world. The knowledge we obtain through a deductive
inference is nothing but an empirical knowledge we obtain through the observa-
tion of the formal system in question; through the observation of a physical fact
of a physical system. Consequently, the certainty of mathematics, that is the
degree of certainty with which one can know the result of a deductive inference,
is the same as the degree of certainty of our knowledge about any other physical
facts.
In order to explain the universal conviction that mathematical truths are
necessary and certain, notice that there are many elements of our knowledge
about the world which seem to be necessary and certain, albeit they have been
obtained from inductive generalization. If we need a shorter stick, we break a
long one. We are “sure” about the outcome of such an operation: the result is
a shorter stick. This regularity of the physical world is known to us from expe-
riences. The certainty of this knowledge is, however, no less than the certainty
of the inference, say, from the Euclidean axioms to the height theorem.
Thus, our physicalist approach resolves the empiricist’s dilemma in the fol-
lowing way:
• Mathematical and logical truths express objective facts of a particular part
of the physical world, namely, the facts of the formal systems themselves.
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They are synthetic, a posteriori, not necessary, and not certain; they are
fallible, but have contingent factual content, as any similar scientific as-
sertion.
• The fact that the formal systems usually are simple physical systems of
stable behavior and that the knowledge of mathematical and logical truths
does not require observations of the world external to the formal systems
explains, psychologically, why mathematical and logical truths appear to
everyone to be necessary, certain and a priori.
The age-long rationalist–empiricist debate is based on the delusion that reason-
ing can deliver us truth of higher degree of certainty than inductive generaliza-
tion. As we have seen, mathematical and logical truth is nothing but knowledge
obtained through inductive generalization from experiences with respect to a
particular physical system, the formal system itself. Since mathematical and
logical derivation is reasoning par excellence, one must conclude that there is no
higher degree of certainty than the one available in inductive generalization.
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